I. Introduction

"…the art of unconventional warfare has traditionally been shunned by the United States in favor of the direct, conventional approach. The consequence of this perception is that the Department of Defense tends to lock their unconventional warfare tools in a box until desperately needed. When deemed necessary to pull the unconventional warfare tools out of the box, the process of using them has been disjointed, haphazard, and inefficient"
Major John W. Silkman 1 The nature of the Global War On Terror (GWOT) has driven U.S. Conventional Forces (CF) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) to unprecedented levels of cooperation on the battlefield, and the historical conventional mistrust of SOF is being overwritten today by successful combined SOF/CF operations. The antecedents for the friction between SOF and CF go back as far as the American Revolutionary War. American militia forces, when operating independently similarly to today's SOF, created chaos in the British rear areas and achieved results that the American regulars could not match. 2 Despite their contributions, senior Continental Army officers regularly disparaged the irregulars' reliability, discipline, and submission to orders. This disdain for SOF and irregular operations in general would become a recurring theme throughout U.S. military history.
Well after the landmark 1986 Nunn-Cohen legislation which greatly increased SOF's capabilities, 3 SOF missions in Operation Desert Storm were generally de-conflicted rather than integrated with conventional operations. The rest of the 1990s were marked with SOF and CF successes and failures, but without a definitive test of integrated SOF and CF C2 under combat conditions. On September 11 th , 2001, SOF stepped into the limelight as the supported command in the GWOT, and the parameters of SOF/CF integration shifted dramatically.
While progress has been made in the synchronization of SOF and CF effects, doctrinal gaps and other Command and Control (C2) issues at operational and tactical levels still detract from the effectiveness of SOF as a critical enabler in the GWOT. 4 The joint force and the Services must continue to improve the ability of SOF to conduct C2
and integrate C2 with their own capabilities. Integrated SOF and CF command and control is a base requirement for maximizing SOF effects in the irregular and asymmetric environments characteristic of the GWOT. This paper will analyze the C2 integration between SOF and CF in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the current main effort of SOF and the U.S. military, and make recommendations for force-wide changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities as appropriate. 5 The analysis framework I will use is from Joint Publication 3.05, Doctrine for Joint Special
Operations, which states that commanders exercising command authority over SOF should:
(1) Provide for a clear and unambiguous chain of command.
(2) Avoid frequent transfer of SOF between commanders.
(3) Provide for sufficient staff expertise to plan, conduct, and support the operations.
(4) Integrate SOF in the planning process.
(5) Match unit capabilities with mission requirements.
Command and control of all aspects of SOF is too broad of a subject to explore in this paper. This paper concentrates on the C2 issues that most pertain to units conducting integrated ground operations, primarily Army Special Forces (SF), Navy SEALs, and U.S. Army and Marine conventional forces. SOF maritime and air operations and other joint SOF such as psychological operations and civil affairs deserve to be explored in much greater detail than I can devote on these pages. The reader should also note that while this paper is written in past tense, the struggle in Iraq is ongoing and much supporting documentation is still classified. Certain specialized SOF counter-terrorism (CT) elements operating in Iraq cannot be addressed at all in unclassified venues, and I have excluded CT units from the specific discussion. These limitations do not, however, unduly constrain an examination of the most important CF/SOF integration issues, and the themes in this paper are generally relevant to all SOF.
II. SOF/CF C2 integration in Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
The The division commander refused to allow the SF Company to pass information laterally to his subordinate units, and insisted on a time-intensive mission approval process.
Without the ability to exercise initiative, the SF Company became ineffective and had to be withdrawn. 9 Cultural differences, lack of understanding, and friction between the Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should id, protect, complement, or sustain another force…Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command….JFCs may establish support relationships within the joint force to enhance unity of effort….
Mutual support. Mutual support is the actions that units render each other against an adversary because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the adversary, and their inherent capabilities.
Establishing supported and supporting relationships between components is a useful option to accomplish needed tasks…components may simultaneously receive and provide support in different mission areas, functions, or operations. For instance, a joint force special operations component may be supported simultaneously for a direct action mission while providing support to a joint force land component for a deep operation… 
III. C2 Analysis of SOF/CF integration in Operation Iraqi Freedom
Provide for a clear and unambiguous chain of command.
At operational level, the joint force commander established a coherent C2 architecture for the major combat phase of OIF with the development of the CFSOCC and two subordinate CJSOTFs. Friction did occur in places, as noted between the 173 rd Airborne BDE and CJSOTF-North, but this was despite a clearly directed TACON relationship.
With most CF and SOF geographically separated during the MCO phase, instances of conventional commanders inhibiting SOF teams' freedom of action were minimal. on a daily basis. These agencies were a major source of information effecting … operations to capture or kill AIF within BN AOs…" 16 Liaison tasks at tactical levels were conducted when necessary through these informal coordination visits, but the lack of sufficient SOF LNOs continued to be identified by CF as a concern.
Integrate SOF in the planning process.
On taking command of SOCCENT in June 2002, brigadier general Gary Harrell noted that "SOF planning to that point had been quite rudimentary.
[SOCCENT] had to get serious about Iraq…we were going to write a SOF campaign plan." 17 General Harrell's efforts led to effective SOF integration in the CENTCOM planning process. Many specific SOF missions were changed or conducted differently than planned due to the dynamic nature of the environment, but the essential tasks of the major SOF elements were well accounted for. In the COIN phase of OIF, integrated planning efforts at the operational level were adequate. Key CJSOTF staff routinely traveled to the MultiNational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) headquarters for planning sessions, and most problems with integration of SOF and CF plans seemed to be related more to the ever-changing threat and a lack of strategic guidance rather than inherent challenges between SOF and CF. 18 Tactical level commanders integrated SOF into planning using the same lateral contacts with SOF leadership as they did to conduct integrated operations. There were many planning shortfalls at tactical level, but most leaders assessed these as driven more by the extremely high operational tempo of both CF and SOF tactical units.
Match unit capabilities with mission requirements.
CENTCOM generally achieved excellent troop to task alignment by keeping SOF units under SOF commanders in the MCO phase. SOF missions to the great extent were practical to their unique unit capabilities and conducted within doctrine. Some units had to scramble for equipment to operate in their unique environments, but SOF units adapted and overcame these issues in time to minimize their importance. 19 In the COIN phase, SOF units were sometimes tasked beyond their organic capabilities due to their relatively small size for operating in high threat environments. Responsive support from local CF units became a baseline requirement for mission accomplishment and survivability.
One C2 capability issue with significant implications is the austere rank and supporting staff structure of SOF units. Prior to the expanded use of SOF in the GWOT, the preferred operational headquarters for a major operation such as OIF would be a CF can be mitigated with the use of liaison teams. However, doctrine tends to address LNO responsibilities as a SOF responsibility only, and limited SOF personnel numbers will rarely allow SOF LNOs below division level. 23 In a GWOT environment, one SOF battalion size unit with fifteen or so operational teams might be working across the sectors of eight to ten conventional coalition brigades with twenty or thirty subordinate battalions. Even a small LNO presence at some of these headquarters would significantly impact the SOF unit's operational capability. Doctrine must be revised to reflect these realities. 
De
Training.
Integrate pre-deployment training between SOF and CF the maximum extent possible.
Due to a brutal deployment tempo, Army SOF participation in the Combined Training Centers (CTCs) since the start of the GWOT has dropped off dramatically. 24 This has reduced tactical level CONUS training opportunities between SOF and CF, and often leads to these units working together for the first time under actual combat conditions.
This has a cascading effect on the leader trust required for mutual support to work well. Significantly increase their mandatory curriculum hours spent on SOF education and make SOF operations critical in exercises at professional development schools. Despite a patent lack of knowledge on SOF and special operations in general in the conventional force, the amount of time and resources professional development schools devote towards education on SOF capabilities and operations is almost insignificant. 25 Education on SOF capabilities, limitations, and effects can and should take a much more prominent role in officer and NCO education.
TTP for integration of SOF should be a major topic of discussion at all levels of the educational system. SOF should routinely be established as the supported force for exercises in professional military education, requiring students to develop strategies for enabling SOF as the main effort. As SOF will likely be the force of choice in the future irregular environments likely to dominate U.S. defense concerns for the future, exposing CF to SOF driven scenarios would also better their ability to understand and operate in such environments.
Materiel.
"People are more important than hardware"
The first SOF truth The current SOF leadership structure was conceived with the expectation that SOF would always be in a subordinate role to CF. While SOF leaders today usually receive excellent consideration, it is simply the nature of any military structure that a (colonel) brigade level CJSOTF commander will not have the same influence as a two-star division commander. As the SOF O-6 level commands become the standard building blocks of CJSOTFs in the GWOT, SOF rank structure must be grown to enable greater input at operational levels. Only by establishing opportunities to grow SOF war-fighting general officers will SOF be able to consistently conduct major operations as an equal partner with CF or the supported command as required. Consideration should be given to increasing the rank authorizations for all SOF who operate primarily as indigenous combat multipliers, Army Special Forces in particular, up one level. For example, Special
Forces "A Detachments" would be led by majors, "B Detachments" by lieutenant colonels, and "C Detachments" (battalion level headquarters) by colonels. While this recommendation is likely to cause multiple coronary events in the halls of the Pentagon, the end state would be better leader interaction and more SOF credibility with both U.S.
conventional forces and the indigenous forces SOF work with.
Establish CF and SOF leader to leader contacts during pre-deployment. The most critical requirements for synchronizing SOF and CF operations are leaders who understand and trust each other -leaders who "get it." CF and SOF leaders must strive to understand each other's capabilities and limitations, to include the differing levels of risk acceptance between SOF and CF, and recognize that their effects can be mutually supporting without being constraining. To facilitate trust and understanding, SOF and CF commanders and key staff personnel should to visit each other in the planning stages of major operations. The priority for these visits should be the establishment of personal contacts. SOF leaders must understand the full spectrum of responsibilities of the CF "landowner," then build rapport and confidence with their conventional counterparts just as they would with indigenous elements. CF leaders must learn what SOF brings to the fight and how to integrate their effects into operations, without restrictive and counterproductive directive C2. When SOF and CF leaders are willing and able to cooperate even when well out of their respective comfort zones, SOF and CF will be on track for seamless integration.
Personnel and Facilities
Beyond the major issues of establishing a greater SOF rank structure and more robust staffs to facilitate CJSOTF operations as previously noted, personnel issues do not have a great impact on SOF/CF command and control. Facilities issues are insignificant in this discussion.
V. Conclusion
A final victory against the stateless threat the U.S. military faces in the GWOT, if such a thing is obtainable at all, will not be won on conventional battlefields. SOF, by definition the primary U.S. military practitioners of counter-terrorism, irregular warfare, and unconventional warfare, will continue to grow in importance to the joint force. Truly synchronized efforts between conventional forces and SOF can only be achieved within a well-defined, well-supported, and well-understood C2 architecture. Strategic leaders of the joint force must establish common communications architectures, refine doctrine, enhance SOF organizational C2, and most of all develop mutual trust through leader education and combined training. Without synchronized effects between SOF and CF, we risk mission failure on current and future GWOT battlefields.
